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Abstract
Recent empirical studies have found a robust correlation between com-
petitive exchange rates and economic growth in developing economies.
This paper presents (i) a formal model to help explain these findings and
(ii) econometric evidence on the relation between investment and the real
exchange rate. The model emphasizes the existence of (hidden) unem-
ployment as a source of endogenous growth, even under constant returns
to scale. Growth promoting policies, however, affect the external balance,
and two instruments are needed in order to achieve targets for both the
growth rate and the trade balance. The real exchange rate can serve as
one of those instruments. The implications of the model for the relation
between real exchange rates and the rate of capital accumulation find
support in our econometric analysis.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies have found a robust correlation between competitive exchange
rates and economic growth. An interesting example is the study by Hausmann
et al. (2003) which identied and analyzed determinants of growth episodes
in the latter half of the twentieth century and found that real exchange depre-
ciations tend to precede sustained growth spurts. Other work includes Razin
and Collins (1997), Polterovich and Popov (2002), Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2007), Gala (2007), Rodrik (2008), and Berg et al. (2008). This emerging body
of empirical evidence - along with East Asias rapid accumulation of reserves
in the pursuit of what is widely seen as export-led growth - has stimulated
interest in the theoretical linkages between the real exchange rate and growth.
The growth enhancing e¤ects of competitive exchange rates are found pri-
marily in developing countries,1 and this nding motivates our approach in this
paper. Unlike developed economies, LDCs typically have large amounts of (hid-
den) unemployment and the development process involves the mobilization of
these unemployed resources. An obvious example is China where record growth
rates over the last three decades have involved moving millions of workers from
the rural hinterland to the industrialized urban areas, mainly in the coastal
provinces in the south and south east. The rural areas have low productivity
and signicant under- and informal employment, and the goods produced in
these informal sectors tend to be relatively non-traded in nature.
The classic Lewis model captures the dual character of developing economies
and the elastic supply of labor to the modern sector but pays little attention
to trade and aggregate demand. These aspects are addressed in open-economy
versions of Keynesian and Kaleckian models in which depreciations tend to
boost demand and raise output in the short-run. A redistribution of income
towards prots, moreover, can stimulate long-run growth in a prot-led regime
in these models.2 The balance of payments constrainedgrowth model (BPCG),
rst developed by Thirlwall (1979), adds to this argument by suggesting that
the need for external balance puts a limit on the sustainable levels of aggregate
demand.3 To the extent that real exchange rate depreciations relax the external
constraint, a depreciation would promote growth in this framework.
Like the Kaleckian and BPGC models, the model in this paper focuses on
the mobilization of unemployed resources, but there are important di¤erences.
Both the Kaleckian and the BPCG models emphasize quantity adjustments over
external relative price adjustments, and the real exchange rate is often treated
as an exogenously given constant in these models. Real depreciations, moreover,
may be expansionary, but the specications of export and import functions in
most BPGC models imply that continuously depreciating exchange rates are
required in order to obtain a lasting e¤ect on growth. Our analysis, by contrast,
1See, for example, Rapetti et al. (2011).
2See, for example, Blecker (2002). To the extent that they come at the expense of other
countries, these e¤ects in Kaleckian models have a beggar-thy-neighbor avor. See Blecker
and Razmi (2008) for an investigation of the fallacy of compositionargument.
3See Porcile and Lima (2010) for a recent contribution in this tradition.
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sees the real exchange rate as a key variable, and we assume that the demand
for exports is perfectly elastic.
We set up a stylized model of a small open economy with two sectors; a
modern sector produces a tradable good while the output of the traditional
sector is non-tradable. Only the former uses capital and, owing to the under-
developed nature of the industrial sector, all capital goods are imported. The
framework has a¢ nities with the dependent economy model, but unlike the
standard versions of this model, we assume that there is substantial hidden or
open unemployment.
The model implies that changes in the real exchange rate a¤ect the level
and composition of employment and that the real exchange rate can, therefore,
be used to facilitate sustained capital accumulation and economic growth. The
basic intuition behind these results is straightforward. Growth is endogenous
in a dual economy without full employment, as evidenced for instance by the
classic Harrod-Domar and Lewis models. This endogeneity of the growth rate
also applies to open economies, but in open economies one needs to consider the
implications of growth promoting policies for the external balance. An increase
in the growth rate may require a more competitive exchange rate, and this
adjustment need not happen automatically.4 Recently, Rodrik (2009)[p. 23]
has argued that, in the presence of trade balance constraints, industrial policy
can be assigned to the structural transformation target while the exchange rate
is assigned to the external balance. Our model can be interpreted as a formal
development of this argument.
Mainstream macroeconomic theory has traditionally seen the real exchange
rate as an endogenous variable whose value is determined in a general equi-
librium set-up by deeperparameters such as preferences, factor endowments,
and productivity. In accordance with this view, the role of exchange rate policy
in causing or sustaining growth has been played down. A body of literature
shows, however, that the real exchange rate tracks the nominal exchange rate
quite closely over time which suggests that targeting the latter may e¤ectively
target the former as well, at least in the short- and medium-run. Moreover, the
ability of policy to target the exchange rate in the presence of capital mobility
may have been underestimated. Governments have a variety of policy options
including monetary and scal policy, saving incentives, capital controls, and re-
serve management, and the evidence suggests that governments do indeed use
these instruments to inuence exchange rates.5 These empirical observations
4See, for example, Chinn and Wei (2008). The lack of exchange rate adjustment in the
face of external imbalances may hinder growth, as has been eloquently illustrated in recent
decades by the economic performance of several developing countries that experienced stop-
and-go cycles during which foreign exchange shortages typically led to the interruption of
growth instead of smooth exchange rate depreciations.
5A detailed discussion of these policy issues is beyond the scope of this paper but see, for
example, the fear of oatingliterature emanating from Calvo and Reinhart (2002), who show
that, in the aftermath of the Asian crises, developing countries have systematically intervened
in the foreign exchange market to manage the behavior of exchange rates. Levi-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2007) nd evidence that in the 2000s such interventions have aimed to maintain
competitive exchange rates or to avoid overvaluations.
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are consistent with the model in this paper. The model has a continuum of equi-
librium paths. All of the paths have balanced trade, but the growth rates and
the real exchange rates di¤er across paths, and the existence of these di¤erent
paths leaves an opening for policy to inuence the outcome.
The empirical part of the paper examines the implications of the model
for the relationship between real exchange rate changes and the rate of capital
accumulation. In the absence of a sophisticated industrial sector that has
the capacity to supply domestic capital goods requirements, a more ambitious
accumulation target requires an undervalued exchange rate to o¤set the e¤ects
on the external balance. We show that real exchange rate undervaluations are
(statistically) signicant drivers of investment growth, but only in developing
countries. This result, which is in line with the model, is robust to di¤erent
specications, controls, and econometric methods.
To the extent that underemployment of resources and the balance of pay-
ments constraint play a crucial role, two important recent papers that perhaps
come closest to this contribution are Gala (2007) and Porcile and Lima (2010).
However, the former explicitly focuses on the short run, assuming adjusting
capacity utilization and nominal wage rigidity and, unlike our two-sector ver-
sion of a small open economy, both use a one-good model with mark-up pric-
ing in an imperfect substitutes framework. The Porcile and Lima study is
purely theoretical while Gala has an empirical section. Unlike our focus on the
investment-real exchange rate relationship, however, he explores the growth-real
exchange rate nexus. Moreover, in order to evaluate whether the real exchange
rate a¤ects investment mainly through the negative e¤ects of overvaluation (the
Dutch disease e¤ect), we dig deeper by investigating possible asymmetries
between under- and overvaluation, between small and large misalignments, and
between developing and high-income economies.
The paper falls in six sections. The benchmark model is presented in Section
2. We analyze the long-run implications of the model in Section 3 and consider
the short run in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the econometrics and presents
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Long-Run Model
The benchmark model is kept simple. It captures, we believe, important features
of most low income countries, and many of the assumptions can be relaxed
without a¤ecting the qualitative conclusions (see Appendix A).6
We consider a small open economy with a non-tradable and a tradable goods
sector. Investment goods are imported while the domestically produced tradable
good can be used for domestic consumption or export. The non-tradable good
6The model eschews explicit intertemporal optimization by a representative agent, following
instead an eclectic, Keynesian approach. One advantage of the eclectic approach is that
by assuming exogenous saving rates (instead of full intertemporal optimization by a single
representative agent) the interaction between di¤erent sectors and agents can be analyzed in
a fairly simple and transparent way.
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is produced using labor (and a xed supply of land),
YN = AL

N ; 0 <   1 (1)
where YN ; LN denote output and employment in the non-tradable sector. Un-
der prot maximization and perfect competition, the income share of labor
would be constant and equal to . We shall retain the assumption of constant
distributive shares in the non-tradable sector but take the share of wages to
equal v. Deviations from marginal productivity pricing could occur for a num-
ber of reasons, including monopsonistic e¤ects or imperfect competition in the
product market (which would imply  < 1) and the inuence of social norms
and conventions (with  ? 1). We do not make any specic assumption about
the value of  but restrict the product  (the share of labor) to be strictly less
than one.7
Empirical measures of the real wage in a traditional, non-tradable sector may
be hard to interpret in the presence of hidden unemployment and underemploy-
ment. Our distributional assumptions imply that the wage share is uniquely
determined, but the e¤ective labor input LN may be spread across a larger
number of workers and/or involve a larger amount of low intensity work. We
therefore consider two distinct measures of the real wage in the traditional sec-
tor. One of them, the e¤ective wage!N , is found by dividing the well-dened
total wage payment by the e¤ective labor input LN :
!N =
wN
pN
= AL 1N ; 0 <   1;  < 1 (2)
An alternative measure assumes that the traditional sector is characterized by
work sharing. If unemployment takes the form of underemployment, the empir-
ically measured wage in the traditional sector may be the average remuneration,
that is, total labor income divided by the number of workers not employed in
the formal sector. This sharing wage(~!N ) is given by
~!N =
!NLN
L  LT  !N (3)
where LT is employment in the tradable sector. Depending on institutional
characteristics, the measured wage in the traditional, non-tradable sector may
fall anywhere between the sharing wage ~!N and the e¤ective wage !N :
Tradable goods are produced in the formal (advanced, capitalist) sector.
This sector uses both labor and capital, and for simplicity a xed coe¢ cient
production function is assumed, i.e.,
YT = minfaLT ;bKg (4)
where YT ; LT and K denote output, employment, and capital in the tradable
goods sector. The parameters a and b are taken to be xed, and we assume that
7The condition  < 1 is needed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium solution when
workers in the traditional sector spend their entire income on non-traded goods. Once we
relax this latter assumption (see Appendix A), this condition is no longer needed.
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there is no labor hoarding and that capital utilization is at the desired rate u.
Hence,
YT = aLT = ubK = bK (5)
where u is desired utilization and b = ub. The utilization assumption will be
modied in section 4 when we address short-run issues.
Labor is mobile across sectors. However, workers in the tradable sector
may receive a wage premium, and we take the tradable-sector real wage to be
determined by the tradable-sector employment rate LT =L, the relative price of
tradables q, and the saving rate s,
!T =
wT
pN
= 

LT
L
; q; s

; 1  0; 2  0; 3  0 (6)
A wage premium may exist in the modern tradable sector for a variety of rea-
sons, including principal-agent problems (e¢ ciency wages) and bargaining in the
presence of costly search and relationship-specic investment. The value of the
sharing wage ~!N along with the tradable-sector employment rate LT =L are key
determinants of workersfallback position in both e¢ ciency wage and bargaining
models, and the general specication in equation (6) is consistent with tradable-
sector wages being determined as a markup on the sharing wage, with the
markup as a function of employment and the exchange rate: !T = (LTL ; q)~!N
(see note 10 below). The real exchange rate enters the  function both because
it determines the total revenue (the size of the pie) in the tradable sector and
may a¤ect the size of the wage premium  and because of its inuence on
the demand for non-tradables, non-tradable employment and the sharing wage;
the saving rate enters the  function because it a¤ects the demand for non-
tradables and the sharing wage.
By denition, the equilibrium condition for non-tradables is given by
YN = EN (7)
where EN is the domestic demand for the non-tradables. We assume that the
non-tradables are used only for consumption. Workers do not save and consume
only non-tradables. Non-workers (capitalists and landlords), on the other hand,
save a fraction s of their income and consume both non-tradables and tradables.
Thus, the demand for non-tradables can be written
EN = !NLN + !TLT + (1  s)[qbK   !TLT + (1  )ALN ] (8)
where  is the proportion of capitalist and landlord consumption that is spent
on the non-tradable. These assumptions about saving rates and the demand for
non-tradables are made because they t the stylized facts for LDCs; Appendix
A examines the implications of allowing worker saving and worker consumption
of tradables.8
8The saving propensity out of wages is small in most developing economies. Even for high
saving countries like China, the bulk of the saving comes from prot and rent income. One
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The proportion  depends on q; and if tradable and non-tradables are gross
substitutes (the likely case), the dependence is positive
 = (q); 0 > 0 (9)
The tradable good can be exported or consumed domestically. We take world
demand to be perfectly elastic at a given price in foreign currency, pT ; and with
a given supply of tradables, the equilibrium condition for the tradable goods
sector serves to determine the trade balance net of investment (or, equivalently,
the net exports of the tradable good),
XT = YT   ET (10)
Clearly, it can be di¢ cult to break into new export markets, and the innite-
elasticity assumption will be modied in the short run analysis (see section 4).
The domestic consumption demand for the tradable good is given by
ET = (1  )(1  s)[qbK   !TLT + (1  )ALN ]=q (11)
and the relative price of tradables, which is our long-run measure of the real
exchange rate, can be written
q =
epT
pN
(12)
where e is the nominal exchange rate (i.e., the domestic currency price of foreign
currency). All capital goods are imported at a world market price pK in foreign
currency. Thus, the trade balance (in terms of non-tradables) can be written
TB = q

XT   pK
pT
I

= q

YT   ET   pK
pT
I

(13)
Trade need not be balanced in the short run but sustainability requirements
constrain the value of the trade balance (relative to the size of the economy) in
the long run. For simplicity, we assume that in the long run
TB = 0 (14)
The accumulation rate in the tradable goods sector depends on its protabil-
ity and the cost of investment.9 Formally,
I
K
= f(r; ) = f
 
b
pT
pK
 
1  
 
LT
L ; q; s

aq
!
; 
!
; fr > 0; f > 0 (15)
indirect piece of evidence in this regard comes from the oft-cited empirical regularity that
the wage share of national income in developing countries tends to be positively correlated
with the consumption share. World Bank (2007, p. 6) illustrates the co-movement of these
variables in China in recent years, and Kuijs (2006) nds that while Chinese household saving
out of disposable income (which includes some interest, rent and prot income) is high, what
makes the saving to GDP ratio exceptional is the presence of high enterprise and government
savings.
Data for a number of developing countries from LABORSTA (2009) suggest that the pro-
portion of household expenditures devoted to food and housing decreases, while that devoted
to clothing and other manufactures increases as we move up the income distribution.
9Domestic investment could also depend on the foreign prot rate but  in line with the
small open economy assumption this is taken to be exogenous and constant.
6
where  can be interpreted as a policy variable that a¤ects the incentive to
invest. We take this policy variable to be an inverse measure of the cost of
nance/the interest rate, rather than, say, a government subsidy to investment
which would need to be nanced, adding variables to the model. Finally, real ag-
gregate income and aggregate domestic demand, both in terms of non-tradables,
are given by
Y = YN + qYT (16)
E = EN + qET + q
pK
pT
I (17)
3 The real exchange rate and economic growth
3.1 Analysis
Tradable-sector employment is determined by the capital stock,
LT =
b
a
K (18)
and, substituting (18) into (6), the tradable-sector wage can be written
!T = 

b
a
K
L
; q; s

(19)
The solutions for non-tradable output, employment and wages are more in-
volved. Using equations (2) and (5)-(8), the equilibrium value of non-tradable
output is
YN =
"
(1  s)q
(1  (1  s)) +
( ba
K
L ; q; s)
a
#
bK
(1  ) (20)
and e¤ective non-tradable employment and wages are given by10
10See Appendix B for more discussion of distributional e¤ects. In the special case where
!T = (
LT
L
; q)~!N , the expression for ~wN can be written
~!N =
a(1  s)q
[1  (1  s)][(1  LT
L
)(1  )  LT
L
]
LT
L
The right hand side of this equation is increasing in the formal-sector employment rate LT =L
and the real exchange rate q and decreasing in the saving rate s. It follows that !T =


LT
L
; q

~!N is a special case of the general specication in equation (6), !T = 

LT
L
; q; s

.
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LN =
("
(1  s)q
(1  (1  s)) +
( ba
K
L ; q; s)
a
#
bK
A(1  )
)1=
(21)
!N = A
("
(1  s)q
(1  (1  s)) +
( ba
K
L ; q; s)
a
#
bK
A(1  )
)( 1)=
(22)
~!N =
1
L  LT 
"
(1  s)q
(1  (1  s)) +
( ba
K
L ; q; s)
a
#
bK
(1  ) (23)
Both tradable and non-tradable employment are increasing in K (equations
(18) and (21)) as are wages in the tradable sector (equation (19)). The non-
tradable sharing wage also depends positively on K (equation (23)) but the
e¤ective real wage in the non-tradable sector is una¤ected if  = 1 or declines
if  < 1 (equation (22)). Non-tradable output, employment, sharing wage, and
tradable-sector wages are increasing in q and decreasing in s; e¤ective wages in
the non-tradable sector are decreasing in q and increasing in s (if  < 1). The
positive e¤ect of q on non-tradable output and employment which is due both
to income and substitution e¤ects ows from the existence of unemployment.
In a standard full employment model, a rise in the relative price of a good
would shift resources away from the sector whose relative price has declined;
with unemployment and a perfectly elastic export demand, however, the change
in relative prices generates an increase in non-tradable demand, and a rise in
employment makes it possible to meet this extra demand.
Turning now to the trade balance, equations (5)-(6), (11), (13)-(15) and (21)
imply that
TB
q pKpT K
=
b
pK
pT
s
1  (1  s)  
I
K
(24)
=
b
pK
pT
s
1  (1  s)   f
 
b
pT
pK
 
1  (
b
a
K
L ; q; s)
aq
!
; 
!
= F

q; ;
K
L

; Fq ? 0; F < 0; FK  0 (25)
The partials F and FK are straightforward. By assumption an increase in  (a
decrease in the cost of nance) stimulates investment, thus reducing the trade
balance; an increase in the capital stock relative to the total labor force, on
the other hand, raises the tradable sector real wage which reduces protability
and accumulation. The e¤ects of an increase in the real exchange rate, by con-
trast, are ambiguous: a real depreciation shifts domestic consumption toward
non-tradables, thus releasing a larger proportion of tradable sector output for
exports, but it may also raise protability and investment (and thus imports).
The evidence suggests that the rst of these e¤ects generally dominates in the
long run: the Marshall-Lerner-Robinson-Bickerdike condition (MLRB condi-
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tion) is usually satised, also for LDCs.11 Assuming that this is the case, we
have Fq > 0 and if TB = 0; equation (25) denes the real exchange rate as a
function of  and K :
q = 

;
K
L

;  > 0; K  0 (26)
The negative sign of K ts the standard Balassa-Samuelson and Bhagwati-
Kravis-Lipsey results: higher levels of income (higher capital stocks) are associ-
ated with an appreciated real exchange rate.
Viewed from another angle, the above analysis shows that two instruments
( and q) are needed to reach two targets ( IK and TB). The structure of the
model is such that, given I=K and TB = 0, equation (24) determines q;
q =  

I
K

;  0 > 0 (27)
where the sign of the derivative  0 follows from the assumption that 0 > 0.
The accumulation function (15) can now be used to determine ;
 = 

I
K
; q;
K
L

;  I
K
> 0; q ? 0; K  0 (28)
Thus, given a target rate of accumulation, the trade balance condition deter-
mines the real exchange rate and the accumulation target then determines the
corresponding investment incentive. Equation (27) captures the key result:
faster accumulation requires real depreciation in order to switch domestic expen-
diture away from tradables and make room for increased capital good imports.
The direct e¤ect of a depreciation on accumulation is ambiguous. This
ambiguity may seem surprising, but the intuition is simple: a depreciation raises
the demand for non-tradables and thereby stimulates both employment and the
shared wage ~!N . The result is upward pressure on real wages in the tradable
sector, and depending on the strength of this e¤ect, tradable sector protability
can go either way. Thus, depending on the precise functional form of the wage
equation (6), a real depreciation may raise or lower the rate of accumulation.
If the MLRB condition is satised, however, a rise in q improves the trade-
balance and even if it raises accumulation, an additional growth stimulus from
reductions in the cost of nance (that is, a rise in ) is necessary to avoid an
improvement in the trade balance: a rise in both q and  is needed to bring
about an increase in I=K while keeping TB = 0.
The comparative statics depend on both the MLRB condition and the as-
sumption of substitutability in consumption (0 > 0). If the former is violated,
11See, for example, Bahmani-Oskoee and Niroomand (1998) for a test of the Marshall-Lerner
condition for a large sample of countries. The standard Marshall-Lerner condition focuses
on demand elasticities, assuming a perfectly elastic supply. In our case this supply elasticity
assumption is far from being met: the supply of traded output is constrained by the capital
stock while the world demand elasticity for traded goods is taken to be innite. Note that
the MLRB condition is less stringent than the Marshall-Lerner condition.
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increased accumulation is associated with a decline in  but the real exchange
rate still depreciates; complementarity in consumption implies that 0 < 0; and
an appreciation is required in order to reduce domestic consumption of tradables
and accommodate a rise in the target accumulation rate.
3.2 Steady growth
The capital stock a¤ects the levels of employment and income (cf. equations
(18)-(23)), and the link between the exchange rate and accumulation therefore
implies that the exchange rate has a growth e¤ect, too.
A steady growth path exists if there are constant returns to labor in the
non-tradable sector ( = 1) and the labor force grows at the rate n: In this
case,
I
K
= n+  (29)
q =  (n+ ) (30)
and equations (28), (18)-(22) and (5) can be used to solve for capital intensity,
employment rates and real wages.
Steady growth with g 6= n may be of greater interest from the perspective
of LDCs. Growth paths of this kind become possible if  = 1 and changes
in LT =L do not a¤ect the tradable-sector real wage (1 = 0 in equation (6)).
The latter condition may be reasonable when there is a large pool of hidden
unemployment. If g > n, the condition will eventually be violated, but the
economy may show endogenous steady growth for a prolonged period, and the
steady growth rate will be related to the real exchange rate, q =  (g + ).
Steady growth paths with a positive growth rate do not exist if there are
diminishing returns to labor in the non-tradable sector and no technical change.
With these assumptions, however, the model has a long-run stationary state if
the total labor supply L is given. In this stationary state we have
I
K
=  (31)
where  is the rate of depreciation and, using equations (27) and (31), the
steady-state value of the real exchange rate is given by
q =  () (32)
Using (28), the investment incentives () now determine the ratio KL and hence
the capital stock, if L is taken as exogenously given. With the capital stock and
the exchange rate xed, equations (20)-(23) can be used to nd non-tradable
employment, output and wages, while outcomes in the tradable sector are given
by (18)-(19). An increase in  pushes up both total output and employment, but
full employment (or ination barriers) sets an upper limit. This upper limit can
be found as in section 3.4 below, but in the absence of a well-dened, structural
NAIRU, a range of employment outcomes may be feasible.
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3.3 Zero sum game?
In this model the pursuit of faster growth through an appropriate combination
of real exchange rates and investment incentives does not imply a zero sum
game: the gains of a fast-growing country are not necessarily o¤set by losses in
other countries. A stylized two country model can be used to demonstrate this.
The home country is described by the model in section 2. We now supple-
ment this with a simple specication of the rest of the world (ROW). We
assume that ROW can produce either investment goods or the tradable con-
sumption good, using the same production process. Thus,
Y K + Y

T = F (L
;K) (33)
This specication of production possibilities implies that pK = pT , assuming
that both types of goods are produced in ROW. Subject to this constraint, the
home country can exchange its tradable good one-for-one for investment goods.
ROW neither gains nor loses from this trade, and the accumulation rate in the
home economy (and the associated real exchange rate) has no impact on ROW.
This result should not be surprising. Growth in our open economy is not
export-led. Our open economy with TB = 0 is isomorphic to a closed economy
in which the modern sector (corresponding to the tradable sector) produces an
output that can be used either for investment or for consumption. With given
investment demand and a given supply of modern sector output, the equilibrium
condition for the modern sector determines the relative price (corresponding to
the real exchange rate), and aggregate employment and output can now be
determined in this closed economy.
Needless to say, it is not our claim that domestic policies never have welfare
e¤ects in other countries. Growth policies, however, need not have negative
externalities for the rest of the world.
3.4 The role of unemployment and the full employment
ceiling
The growth policies in this paper are predicated on the existence of unemploy-
ment. This raises two questions for the applicability of the model.
The set of solutions, rst, must satisfy a full employment constraint. Using
(18) and (21), this constraint can be written
LN (q;K; s) + LT (K)  L (34)
For a given value of L; this equation denes a maximum, full-employment value
of the real exchange rate
q  qmax = h(K; s); hK < 0; hs > 0 (35)
The presence of large amounts of (hidden) un- and underemployment suggests
that this condition fails to be binding in most LDCs. Using (26), however, it is
readily seen that the maximum value of the real exchange rate translates into
11
a maximum growth rate of the capital stock. As the capital stock increases
(relative to the population) the maximum values of the real exchange rate and
the associated growth rate both decline. Putting it di¤erently, an undervalued
exchange rate and fast capital accumulation ceases to be desirable when the
capital stock is large relative to the size of the total labor force and the pool of
unemployment (and underemployment) dries up. This property of the model
is consistent with empirical ndings: the relation between undervaluation and
growth holds only for developing countries (see Sections 1 and 5).
A second question concerns the potential role of market forces in securing full
employment. The presence of unemployment may lead to downward pressure
on money wages and with a given world market price of traded goods and a
given nominal exchange rate, a reduction in money wages translates into a real
depreciation. Thus, with exible labor markets there would seem to be no need
for exchange rate policy: a exible money wage should take the economy to a
full employment position with q = qmax.
The benets of increased money wage exibility can be questioned  the
classic argument was outlined by Keynes (1936) and Fisher (1933) but it is
beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss these issues in any detail. For
present purposes it is su¢ cient to note that as a factual matter, nominal wages
do not appear to fall in economies with large amounts of hidden and open
unemployment and under these circumstances exchange rate policy becomes
important.12
In the presence of nominal wage stickiness, adopting a oating exchange
rate regime may be considered an alternative solution to achieve full employ-
ment. The empirical evidence on nominal exchange rate behavior, however,
casts serious doubts in this regard. The disconnect of nominal exchange rate
movements from macroeconomic fundamentals in the short- and medium-run
is a well established phenomenon.13 Thus, the exchange rate adjustment that
is required to mobilize unemployed workers may not automatically occur and,
when it does, it may take the form of a sharp depreciation in the wake of a
balance of payment crisis.
12 It should be noted perhaps that an extremely high value of the real exchange rate may
be required to achieve full employment. If the real exchange rate and thereby the ratio of
non-tradable to tradable goods in the consumption bundle moves beyond a certain point, the
gross substitutability assumption in equation (9) may cease to hold. When that happens, a
further increase in the real exchange rate reduces the rate of accumulation that is consistent
with balance of payments equilibrium.
A better route to higher employment without adverse consequences for the balance of pay-
ments or the rate of accumulation would be introduce reforms that shift income in the tra-
ditional sector from prots (rent) to wages. Korean and Taiwanese land reforms in the late
1940s and early 1950s may exemplify shifts of this kind. In terms of the model, a rise in 
stimulates employment but leaves the trade balance una¤ected (equations (21) and (24)).
13See, for example, the literature following Meese and Kenneth (1983), which showed that a
range of macroeconomic models were unable to beat a random walk in forecasting the behavior
of nominal exchange rates.
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4 Short-run dynamics
At least three assumptions need to be relaxed if the model is to be applied to
the short run: export demand is not perfectly elastic, capital in the modern
sector is not always fully utilized, and net exports are not always zero. With
respect to exports, we assume that the level is predetermined at any moment
but that the growth of exports depends on the international competitiveness of
the domestically produced export good
X^ = F

pT
pT

; F 0 < 0 (36)
where pT is the (foreign currency) price of the foreign goods and a ^  over
a variable is used to denote a growth rate (X^ = (dX=dt)=X). The relation
between the terms of trade and the relative price q is given by
pT
pT
=
epT
pN
pN
epT
= q=z (37)
where z = epT =pN : We take z to be a policy variable. The domestic currency
price of the domestically produced tradable good (epT ); on the other hand,
depends on demand conditions. A simple specication along the lines suggested
by Flaschel and Skott (2006) relates changes in the price markup to the rate of
utilization:
e^+ p^T = w^T + (u  u) (38)
where u and u are the actual and desired capital utilization rates in the tradable
sector. We simplify the wage specication for the tradable sector by assuming
that the real wage is constant in terms of non-tradables
!T =
wT
pN
= ! (39)
This assumption implies that w^T = p^N ; and we get the following expression for
the growth rate of q;
q^ = e^+ p^T   p^N = (u  u) (40)
The utilization rate in the tradable sector is determined by
u =
YT
bK
=
X + ET
bK
=
X
bK
+ (1  )(1  s)

u  !LT
qbK
+ (1  ) YN
qbK

=
X
bK
+ (1  )(1  s)u

1  (1  ) +

(1  s)
(1  (1  s)) + (1  )

or
u =
1  (1  s)
s
X
bK
= h(q)
X
K
; h0 < 0 (41)
where 

= epTYT wTLTepTYT = 1  1a !q

is the prot share and the sign of h0 follows
from the assumption of gross substitutability. The prot rate, a key determinant
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of accumulation, is given by
r = 
pTYT
pKK
= u
pT
pK
b = u
pT
pK
qb
z
(42)
Using (41) and (42) the accumulation function (15) can now be written
K^ =
I
K
  
= g(u; q; ; z)  ; gu > 0; gq > 0; g > 0; gz < 0 (43)
and, combining (36) and (43), we have
X^   K^ = F
q
z

  g(u; q; ; z) +  (44)
Given  and z; equations (40) and (44) form a two dimensional system of di¤er-
ential equations in (XK ; q). There is a unique (non-trivial) stationary point and
the Jacobian is given by
J

X
K
; q

=
 guh 1zF 0   guh0XK   gq
h h0XK

The determinant and trace are positive and negative, respectively, and the sta-
tionary point is (locally asymptotically) stable. The utilization rate is equal to
the desired rate at the stationary point, but the stationary solution depends on
the policy variables  and z; and the trade balance need not be zero if  and z
are set independently.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics. The q^ = 0 locus is upward sloping while
the ([X=K) = 0 locus can be either negatively or positively sloped; in the latter
case it is steeper than the q^ = 0 locus. An increase in z (a real depreciation)
leaves the q^ = 0 locus unchanged but shifts the ([X=K) = 0 locus upwards. Thus,
starting from an arbitrary point in the phase diagram (i.e. allowing u 6= u) a
real depreciation raises the growth rate of exports and this generates (possibly
with a delay) an increase in the accumulation rate: the new stationary point
has a higher value of q and an unchanged value of u; and from the accumulation
function it therefore follows that the system converges to a stationary point with
a higher accumulation rate. The utilization rate initially falls but then increases
again as it moves toward the (unchanged) desired rate.
An increase in  also raises the accumulation rate. The ([X=K) = 0 locus
shifts down and the new solution involves a lower export-capital ratio. Thus,
a depreciation and an increase in the investment incentive have similar e¤ects
on the accumulation rate, but the implications for the trade balance are quite
di¤erent. We have
TB
K
= pT
X
K
  pK(K^ + ) (45)
At a stationary point X^ = K^ = g and pT = pT (g). Hence,
TB
K
= pT (g)
X
K
  pK(g + ) (46)
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An increase in g reduces the trade balance, and if the stimulus comes from an
increase in , this e¤ect is reinforced by a decline in the export-capital ratio. If
the stimulus comes from a real depreciation, however, the deterioration may be
o¤set by an increase in the export-capital ratio.
5 Empirics
5.1 Empirical model
Our theoretical model predicts a positive relationship between the degree of
exchange rate undervaluation and the rate of capital accumulation in countries
that have widespread underemployment and are heavily reliant on imported cap-
ital goods; traits that are characteristic mainly of developing countries. Figure
2 illustrates the relationship between undervaluation, accumulation, and out-
put growth for China in a striking manner. We now explore this prediction
econometrically, and for a large data set.
Lacking reliable and consistent panel data for the capital stock, we rewrite
the accumulation equation to get an expression for the average rate of growth
of investment (GROWTHGFCF ). Using equation (43), we have
I
K
= g(u; q; ; z)
or,
ln I = lnK + ln g(u; q; ; z) (47)
The values of u and q converge to stationary points determined by (; z). With
fast convergence, the average values of u and q over a discrete period will be
determined largely by the contemporary values of (; z); more generally, both
contemporary and lagged values of (; z) will a¤ect u and q. Thus, equation
(47) suggests the following discrete-time version of the investment equation
ln I = lnK + lnH(;  1; ::: n; z; z 1; :::; z n) (48)
Taking rst di¤erences, this investment equation implies that
 ln I =  lnK + lnH(;  1; ::: n; z; z 1; :::; z n)
=
I 1
K 1
+ lnH(;  1; ::: n; z; z 1; :::; z n)
= G(;  1; ::: n;  (n+1); z; z 1; :::; z n; z (n+1)) (49)
We use the degree of undervaluation as an indicator of the z variable and include
a range of variables to control for the general investment/growth environment
(corresponding here to the current and lagged values of ). Thus, using a linear
approximation and setting n = 1, we estimate equations of the form
GROWTHGFCFit = + 0 lnRGDPCHit 1 + 0 lnUNDERV ALit
+1 lnUNDERV ALit 1 + 2 lnUNDERV ALit 2
+Xt + ft + fi + "it (50)
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We follow the three-step methodology pursued by Rodrik (2008) to obtain an
index of real exchange rate undervaluation, i.e., UNDERV AL (see Appendix C
for more details). The dependent variable is the average annual rate of invest-
ment growth, RGDPCHit 1 captures the convergence term, ft time specic
e¤ects, fi country specic e¤ects, "it is the error term, and X is a vector of
standard control variables, which includes government consumption, the ina-
tion rate, gross domestic savings,14 degree of openness, human capital (years of
education), terms of trade, foreign debt, real exchange rate volatility, and an
index of rule of law. Table 1 lists the variable denitions and data sources.
The long-run e¤ect of a persistent increase in undervaluation (the sum of the
 coe¢ cients) is expected to be positive, but the existence of lags implies that
the individual  coe¢ cients cannot be signed unambiguously by the model.15
5.2 Econometric estimates
We conducted a series of panel data regressions for a data set of a maximum of
153 countries and up to nine 5-year time periods spanning 1960-2004.16 The av-
erage annual rate of investment growth (GROWTHGFCF ) is calculated from
the gross xed capital formation (GFCF) series obtained from the World Banks
World Development Indicators. Ideally, one would want to include lags of the
14Since both our model and casual empiricism suggest that the saving rate is a¤ected by
the real exchange rate, UNDERV AL and the saving rate (GDSGDP ) are likely to be highly
collinear. To correct for multicollinearity, we estimated the e¤ect of undevaluation on the sav-
ing rate (GDSGDP = + lnUNDERV ALit+ft+fi+"it) and then used the residuals of this
regression as a control variable. With this methodology the coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV AL
captures its direct e¤ect on the dependent variable (GROWTH) and its indirect e¤ect through
the saving rate. The coe¢ cient on the residuals captures the e¤ect of the saving rate on the
dependent variable, net of the e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL.
15The rst-order approximation of (53) at a stationary point (; z; _; _z) = (; z; 0; 0)
can be written
 ln I = +
nX
i=0
H i (
; z) (i+1) +
nX
i=0
Hzi (
; z)z (i+1)
+
nX
i=0
H i
H
( i    (i+1)) +
nX
i=0
Hz i
H
(z i   z (i+1)
= +
H
H
 +
Hz
H
z +
n 1X
i=0
 
H (i+1)
+
H (i+1)  H i
H
!
 (i+1)
+
n 1X
i=0
 
Hz (i+1) +
Hz (i+1)  Hz i
H
!
z (i+1) +

H n  
H n
H

 (n+1)
+

Hz n  
Hz n
H

z (n+1)
With 5-year periods, each estimated coe¢ cient may be a weighted average of some of the
coe¢ cients in the above equation and cannot be unambiguously signed. The long-run e¤ect
of a persistent change in undervaluation, however, is given by
P
Hz i > 0:
16We exclude from the sample extreme values of the undervaluation index from the sample
( 1:5 > lnUNDERV AL > 1:5). This involves excluding a maximum of 15 data points.
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controls. Since many of the controls are only available for shorter periods, how-
ever, there would be a high cost in terms of degrees of freedom.
Table 2 reports results from the estimation of equation (50) for the whole
sample with di¤erent combinations of control variables. The table reports the
individual estimates of coe¢ cients on lnUNDERV AL (i) and also its long-run
e¤ect, along with the associated Wald statistic for the test of joint signicanceP2
i=0 ^i = 0. In columns 1 to 5, the coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV ALt 1 is signif-
icant at 1% and stable in the range 0.042-0.051. This would suggest that some
time is needed for a competitive currency to stimulate investment decisions.
The current e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL is slightly negative (between -0.002 and
-0.017) and insignicant, whereas the twice lagged coe¢ cient is negative, varies
between -0.015 and -0.027 and is signicant at either 5% or 10%, except for
the baseline equation where it is not signicant. When we consider the over-
all long-run e¤ect of undervaluation on investment growth, we observe that it
tends to be small and statistically insignicant, except for the baseline equation
in which it is moderately large (0.023) and the Wald test indicates signicance
at 10%. In the regressions that include the terms of trade and the rule of
law index (columns 6 and 7, respectively) lnUNDERV AL and its lags are not
signicant either individually or jointly. Column 8 reports the regression in
which lnUNDERV AL interacts with the level of GDP per capita. The nega-
tive sign on the interaction term indicates that as income per capita increases
the e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL decreases. According to the estimated coe¢ cients,
the long-run e¤ect of undervaluation becomes nil at a level of GDP per capita
around $8,800. Thus, the positive e¤ect of undervaluation on investment growth
appears to operate particularly for developing countries.17
In order to investigate di¤erences among countries at di¤erent levels of in-
come, we rst used a relatively standard classication in dening developed
countries as a group of 23 countries typically considered industrialized.18 We
refer to this as Classication I.One potential objection to this classication is
its static nature: countries are classied as either developed or developing based
on their current status. In our sample period that covers 45 years, it is not ev-
ident that a country that is now seen as developed would have been considered
the same at the beginning of the sample. Some European countries in the im-
mediate post-war period come to mind in this regard. Similarly, there might be
developing countries today which could have been considered developed at the
beginning of the sample. An example is Argentina. In order to provide a more
dynamic classication of countries, our second classication, termed Classi-
cation II,denes developed countries as those which in a given 5-year period
were at a per capita GDP level at least half that of the US, excluding those that
had a population of less than a million in 2004. Under this classication, some
17We also tried non-linear specications but found the quadratic interaction term to be
insignicant.
18The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zeland, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switerland, United Kindom and United States. Other studies have
followed a similar classication. See, for example, Prasad et al. (2007).
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countries are dened as developed (developing) at the beginning but not at the
end of the sample. As a further robustness test, we follow Rodrik (2008) and
others by classifying countries based on their per capita income; under Classi-
cation III, countries with a per capital real GDP below $6,000 (in constant 2000
dollars) are classied as developing and the rest as developed. In the remainder
of this section, we focus on the results from Classication I, only briey report-
ing results for the other classications for comparison. The detailed results for
Classications II and III, which are largely similar, are reported in a separate
available-on-request appendix.
Tables 3 and 4 provide further evidence that the e¤ect of undervaluation on
investment growth is particularly important for developing countries (as dened
under Classication I). Table 3 reports the xed e¤ect regressions for developing
countries. The long-run e¤ect of undervaluation is large, signicant and robust
to various controls. In columns 1 to 6, the estimated long-run coe¢ cient is in
the range of 0.056-0.066. The only case where the coe¢ cient is smaller and not
signicant is the regression that includes the rule of law index (column 7). Note,
however, that undervaluation is not the only variable that loses explanatory
power. Most of the control variables that in the previous specications are
highly signicant turn insignicant here. This result is likely attributable to the
small number of observations available for the rule of law index.19
Again, the positive e¤ect of undervaluation on investment growth appears
to operate mainly through the rst lag. The estimated coe¢ cient for 1 is al-
ways large and signicant (except for that in column 7). On the other hand,
the current e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL is negative and almost always insigni-
cant. Finally, the positive long-run e¤ect of currency undervaluation on invest-
ment growth for developing countries is robust to changes in the sample period
(columns 8 and 9). When we split the sample into two sub-periods (1960-1984
and 1985-2004), the long-run coe¢ cient of lnUNDERV AL is signicant at 5%
in both periods.
Table 4 shows the results for developed countries. Because of the small num-
ber of observations, we introduce control variables individually. The long-run
e¤ect of undervaluation is statistically indistinguishable from zero in all the re-
gressions. The estimated coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV ALt 1 is large and positive
(although not very signicant) but is neutralizedby the negative e¤ects of the
current level and second lag. The results using the other classications, reported
in the available-on-request appendix, are qualitatively similar to those in Tables
3 and 4, except for that, with Classication III, the e¤ect of undervaluation on
investment growth turns negative for developed countries.
Tables 5-7 report robustness checks of the positive relationship between cur-
rency undervaluation and investment growth found for developing countries.
Since the real exchange rate is arguably determined jointly with other variables,
a potential concern is that the results provided in Table 3 are contaminated
by endogeneity/simultaneity problems. To address this issue, we carry out dy-
19This conclusion receives strong support from our nding that all the insignicant control
variables continue to be insignicant if we run the regression with the sample of countries that
report data for the rule of law index, but exclude the index itself as a control variable.
18
namic panel estimations using the Arellano-Bond two-step General Method of
Moments (GMM) method. We treat lnUNDERV AL as endogenous and use
its lagged values as instruments.20 Table 5 reports the main results. The long-
run coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV AL (row (e)) is signicant at 1% for developing
countries regardless of classications type. It is reassuring to see that the values
of the estimates with GMM are relatively similar to those of the baseline xed
e¤ects OLS estimation.21 As in the OLS estimations, the individual coe¢ cient
on the rst lag is large and signicant, and the coe¢ cient on the current value
is positive but generally insignicant. The estimated values for the individual
coe¢ cients are also similar.22 For developed countries, the long-run coe¢ cient
is not signicant under either classication I or II. For the whole sample, the es-
timated long-run coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV AL is signicant at 1%, but lower
than that for developing countries. Overall, the results of the GMM estimations
support the earlier ndings.
It is possible that our results are dominated by the e¤ects of extreme real
exchange rate misalignments. Table 6, therefore, reports robustness checks
for sensitivity to the magnitude of misalignment. Columns 1-3 present the
results of the baseline regression applied to successively narrower ranges of
lnUNDERV AL for developing countries. The long-run coe¢ cient is always
positive and signicant. The estimated e¤ect ranges from 0.046 to 0.063. As in
the previous analyses, the e¤ect of undervaluation on investment growth oper-
ates mainly through the rst lag. Columns 4-6 introduce the controls previously
used in column 4 of Table 3. Adding controls makes little di¤erence to the mag-
nitude or signicance of results. The e¤ect of misalignment on investment
growth is signicant regardless of its size.
The relevant literature has, until recently, mostly focused on the negative
impact of overvaluations on growth. This suggests another possibility; namely
that our results are mainly picking up the negative impact of overvaluations on
accumulation, rather than a positive e¤ect of undervaluation. Table 7 explores
asymmetries in the relationship between the undervaluation index and capital
accumulation. Columns (1) and (4) report the estimated coe¢ cients for the
baseline equation applied separately to developing countries with undervalued
(lnUNDERVAL > 0) and overvalued (lnUNDERVAL < 0) exchange rates, re-
spectively. The long-run e¤ect of undervaluation is marginally insignicant for
countries with undervalued exchange rates and only signicant at 10% for coun-
tries with overvalued exchange rates. A problem with these point criteria (i.e.,
7 0) is that we do not exploit the variability produced by countries that move
from one state to another (e.g. from being undervalued to being overvalued).
20Given that in the regressions reported in Table 3, the second lag of lnUNDERV AL was
systematically insignicant and very close to zero, we omit it from the GMM analysis. Also,
since from a general equilibrium perspective lnRGDPCHt 1 and lnUNDERV ALt 1 are
endogenous variables, we treated both as endogenous regressors in the GMM regressions.
21The GMM and OLS estimates (Table 3) for the baseline specication are b0+ b1 = 0:079
and 0:066;respectively.
22We get b0 = 0:012 and b1 = 0:048 in the OLS estimation, and b0 = 0:021 and b1 = 0:042
in the GMM estimation.
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Another limitation arises from the fact that it is impossible to have an accurate
point estimate of the equilibrium real exchange rate. One way to ameliorate
these limitations is by dening the equilibrium rate as a narrow band rather than
a point. Columns (2) and (5) analyze the cases where equilibrium is dened as
-0.05<lnUNDERV AL<0.05. Columns (3) and (6) replicate the analysis using
a 0:1 as the limits. The long-run coe¢ cient is signicant for both overvalua-
tion and undervaluation, indicating that while the former promotes investment
growth in developing countries, the latter undermines it. 23
The evidence reported in this section suggests that real undervaluations have
a positive e¤ect on investment growth mainly for developing countries. This con-
clusion results from two sources. First, we found that lnUNDERV AL interacts
negatively with the level of real GDP per capita, indicating that its e¤ect on
investment growth decreases with countries income level. Second, using our
various classications of developed and developing countries, we found that the
e¤ect of undervaluation on investment growth is large and signicant only for
developing countries. The small sample size for developed countries somewhat
limits the condence with which we can assess the results, but additional sup-
port comes from the coe¢ cient on the interaction term in Table 2, and from fact
that the long-run e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL is insignicant for the whole sample
(Table 2), but signicant for developing countries (Table 3). These ndings
are robust to econometric methodology and di¤erent degrees of exchange rate
misalignment.
6 Conclusions
The theoretical part of this paper analyzed an economy with signicant amounts
of open and/or hidden unemployment. In this economy, non-tradable output
and employment are demand-led, and an investment stimulus can a¤ect both
the level of output and the growth rate. But growth is not export-led in the
sense of net exports acting as a necessary driver of demand. Instead, there is a
close a¢ nity with the argument presented by Rodrik (1997) who saw investment
promotion rather than exports as key to growth in Taiwan and Korea. Invest-
ment promotion, however, has implications for the balance of payments and
requires a suitable real exchange rate policy in order to be sustainable. Thus,
the real exchange rate becomes a critical element of successful development.
The model highlights the mobilization of underemployed resources as a
source of economic growth, and to simplify the analysis we deliberately left out
other potential explanations of the link between exchange rates and economic
performance. An alternative approach focuses on dynamic e¤ects associated
with learning by doing or other growth enhancing externalities in the tradable
sector. Rodrik (2008) gives a full-employment version of this argument. Pro-
23Tightening the band to 0:01 yields similarly signicant results. Also, we conducted the
same analysis using the period t-1 to determine whether the exchange was undervalued or
overvalued and obtained qualitatively similar results. These are reported in the available-on-
request appendix.
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duction in the tradable sector, he suggests, is strongly a­ icted by institutional
weaknesses and market failures, and these problems lead to a bias against this
sector in the allocation of resources. Exchange rate undervaluation boosts prof-
its in the tradable sector and the resulting sectoral reallocation raises the growth
rate in an AK-type model of endogenous growth.24 Rodriks full employment
assumption is questionable, but unemployment and scale economies clearly are
not mutually exclusive. Kaldor (1966) built the theoretical argument for his
growth lawsaround a combination of dynamic increasing returns to scale in
industry and the existence of hidden unemployment, and a large literature has
developed and extended his analysis. The real exchange rate, however, has
played a limited role in this literature, and an examination of the interaction
between the mobilization and scale e¤ects of the real exchange rate is left for
future research.
The empirical part explores the main implication of our model: the existence
of a positive relationship between real exchange rate undervaluation and invest-
ment growth. If, as suggested by the model, the presence of under-employment
and reliance on imported capital goods constitute important channels through
which the real exchange rate a¤ects the economy, targeting the latter may be
more e¤ective in promoting accumulation and employment in low income de-
veloping countries compared to developed countries. Our econometric results,
which are robust to a variety of classications, controls, sample periods, and
estimation techniques provide support to this prediction.
A Extension: respecifying workersconsumption
As a more general specication, one could allow for saving out of wage income,
with saving propensities that depend on both sector and income category, and
let the composition of consumption depend on the source of income. Thus, let
sw and sr represent the saving rates out of wages and rents in the non-tradable
sector and w and p the corresponding rates for the tradable sector, and let p
and w be the shares of non-tradables in the consumption out of prots/rents
and wages. The equilibrium condition for the non-tradable can now be written
YN = w(1 sw)YN+w(1 w)WT+p(1 sr)(1 )YN+p(1 p)(qYT WT )
where WT = ( bKa ; q; sw; sr; w; p)
bK
a is the wage bill in the tradable sector.
Solving for YN and substituting into the expression for ET ; we get
ET = AYT +
B
q
WT
24 It should be noted that even if the magnitude of the externalities is insu¢ cient to allow
for permanent endogenous growth in a closed economy, they may generate multiple equilibria
in an open economy, and a temporary exchange rate shock can send the economy to a new
long run equilibrium (Krugman, 1987; Ros and Skott, 1998).
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where
A = (1  p)  p(1  p) sw + sr(1  )
1  w(1  sw)   p(1  sr)(1  )
B = (p   w)  [(1  w)w   (1  p)p] sw + sr(1  )
1  w(1  sw)   p(1  sr)(1  )
The value of A is decreasing in q as long as the substitutability condition
is satised for both p and w (0p(q) > 0; w(q) > 0). Hence, the condition
@

B
qWT

=@q  0 is su¢ cient to ensure that the domestic demand for trad-
ables will be inversely related to the real exchange rate. Our specication in
section 2 emerges as a special case with w = 1; sw = w = 0; sr = p = s > 0.
Another simple case arises with uniform saving rates and consumption compo-
sitions (w = p and sw = w = sr = p = s > 0). Both of these cases satisfy
the above stated condition since, in both cases, B  0.
B Distributional e¤ects
Changes in real exchange rates inuence income distribution. The wage share
of total output can be written
!NLN + !TLT
YN + qYT
=
!NLN
YN
YN
YN + qYT
+
!TLT
qYT

1  YN
YN + qYT

(51)
Hence, the change in the wage share becomes
d

!NLN + !TLT
YN + qYT

=
YN
YN + qYT
d

!NLN
YN

+

1  YN
YN + qYT

d

!TLT
qYT

+

!NLN
YN
  !TLT
qYT

d

YN
YN + qYT

(52)
By assumption the wage share in the non-tradable sector is constant (!NLN=YN =
) so the rst term on the right hand side is zero. The signs of the second and
third terms, however, are both ambiguous.
Turning to the wage rate, our (strong) assumption about the composition
of workersconsumption implies that a growth policy and the associated real
depreciation raise the consumption real wage in the formal sector as well as the
e¤ective employment and the average remuneration in the traditional sector.
These results, which hold for a given capital stock, are reinforced by the pos-
itive e¤ects of higher accumulation on wages and employment in both sectors.
Fast growth, by construction, is generated by raising the rate of return relative
to the cost of nance in the tradable sector, and it follows that workers and
tradable-sector capitalists have a shared interest in growth. Distributional con-
icts between workers and capitalists may emerge if workers consume tradables
and the wage function  is insensitive to changes in q, but as long as the share
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of tradables in workersconsumption remains small, the consumption real wage
would decline much less, proportionately, than the product real wage.
Opposition to a growth policy that involves a real depreciation could come
from landlords. By lowering the real wage in the traditional sector, a depreci-
ation increases rents, but the change in the relative price may reduce the real
value of rents. Depending on the composition of landlord consumption (and
thus the relevant price index), the net e¤ect could go either way.
C Deriving the index of real exchange rate mis-
alignment
We follow the three-step methodology pursued by Rodrik (2008) to obtain an
index of real exchange rate undervaluation. Using data from Penn World Tables
6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006), we rst calculate the real exchange
rate (RER) as the ratio between the nominal exchange rate (XRAT ) and the
purchasing power parity conversion factor (PPP ). We use a 5-year frequency,
in which each observation corresponds to the period average. Both variables are
expressed as national currency units per U.S. dollar. However, since PPP is
calculated over the entire GDP, the basket includes non-tradables for which we
do not expect the law of one price to hold. Thus, in order to calculate equilibrium
real exchange rates, in a second step we adjust for the Balassa-Samuelson (BS)
e¤ect, regressing RER on real GDP per capita (RGDPCH):
lnRERit = +  lnRGDPCHit + ft + "it (53)
where i and t are country and time indexes, respectively, ft accounts for time
xed e¤ects, and "it is the error term. We obtain an estimate of b =  0:24,
with a t-statistic of 21.29. The sign of the coe¢ cient is in line with the Balassa-
Samuelson prediction; in this case, a 10% increase in RGDPCH is associated
with a 2.4% real appreciation. Finally, we dene the undervaluation index
(UNDERV AL) as the ratio of actual to BS-adjusted real exchange rates:
UNDERV ALit = RERit=\RERit. Dened in index form, UNDERV AL is
comparable across countries and over time; when it exceeds unity, the domestic
currency is undervalued in real terms (i.e., domestic goods are cheap in interna-
tional dollar terms). We use lnUNDERV AL as the main variable of interest;
it has a zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.47.
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